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HOW SCIENTISTS VIEW CAUSALITY AND
ASSESS EVIDENCE: A STUDY OF THE
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S EVALUATION
OF HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE
Irva Hertz-Picciotto, Ph.D., M.P.H.
INTRODUCTION

Professor of Epidemiology, Department of Public Health Sciences,
University of California, Davis; Chair, 2000 and 2002 Institute of
Medicine/National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Health Effects in
Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Herbicides.
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The courts are often called upon to settle disputes in which
health damages are alleged to have been caused by environmental
exposures to chemical, physical, or biologic agents. Similarly,
health scientists are often called upon to assess evidence regarding
diseases or developmental injuries that might be regarded as
resulting from specific exposures. The overarching purpose of this
paper is to familiarize readers with the way in which scientists
assess data and view evidence about causality, using the example
of herbicide and related exposures incurred by U.S. military
personnel during service in Vietnam.
One mechanism by which governmental or regulatory agencies
at the international, national, or regional levels seek advice from
scientists is by convening expert panels. These panels or advisory
boards may be assembled as part of an ongoing program that
reviews the state of the scientific literature on a topic or in
response to specific needs. For example, panels may be assembled
to help formulate a regulatory standard for a chemical in drinking
water, ambient air, or the workplace environment. Thus, the
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Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (codified as
amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1116) [hereinafter Agent Orange Act].
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documents produced by expert committees may become the
foundation for the development of health-related policies.
The Institute of Medicine Committee to Review the Health
Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides (“IOM
Committee” or “Committee”) is one such panel. This Committee
was formed under the mandate of Public Law 102-4 (better known
as the Agent Orange Act)1 to provide reports on a biannual basis to
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), beginning in 1994.
These reports were concerned with the potential adverse effects
that might have been experienced by those who served in Vietnam
because of exposures to herbicides, particularly the mixture
dubbed Agent Orange, or contaminants found in this mixture,
including the well-known chemical compound commonly referred
to as “dioxin.”
Part I of this article introduces the charge to the Committee, the
process the Committee followed in order to reach conclusions
about the evidence, the types of studies it considered, and the
evidentiary categories it established for classifying specific health
outcomes. Part II provides context for the decisions of the IOM
Committee through a discussion of the principles that guided the
Committee’s evaluative process and a presentation of the scientific
concepts that constitute the foundation for inferences about
causation in biomedical research. Part III explains the approach
used by scientists, specifically, epidemiologists, for conducting
studies in populations, estimating causal effects, and examining
hypotheses. It also focuses more concretely on the obstacles to
inferences about causation, specifically, imprecision, which is the
uncertainty that arises from studying small samples, and bias,
which is the uncertainty that derives from imperfections in study
methodology. Part IV narrows this discussion to a description of
the major types of bias—confounding, information, selection, and
statistical bias.
In contrast to the preceding sections, which focus on individual
epidemiologic studies, Part V delineates the process by which
scientists reach consensus and presents the framework commonly
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used in weighing a body of evidence involving sometimes dozens
of studies. Part VI returns to the work of the IOM Committee and
provides a detailed discussion of the evidence the Committee
reviewed regarding the four outcomes mentioned above, taking
into consideration the concepts presented in Parts III through V.
I. VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
COMMITTEE

A. Charge to the Committee

2
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Id.
Id. §§ 2-3.
4
Id. § 3(g)(1) (requiring that a report be submitted to the Secretary of
Veteran Affairs “at least once every two years”).
5
Id. § 3(d)(1). See also COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN
VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS
OF HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM 221 (1994) [hereinafter VAO 1994].
3
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In light of growing concern about the health of Vietnam
veterans, Congress enacted Public Law 102-4, the Agent Orange
Act of 1991.2 Through this Act, Congress directed the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs to request from the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) a comprehensive evaluation of the potential health
effects from exposure to Agent Orange, a chemical compound used
as a defoliant by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War.3 This
legislation also called for reviews of newly available information
on a biannual basis for a period of ten years.4 The Institute of
Medicine (IOM) of the NAS convened a Committee to carry out
this work. The charge to the Committee was to determine “to the
extent that available scientific data permit meaningful
determinations” the answers to three questions regarding specific
health outcomes and their relationships to Agent Orange
exposure.5 The first was “whether a statistical association with
herbicide exposure exists, taking into account the strength of the
scientific evidence and the appropriateness of the statistical and
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epidemiologic methods used to detect the association.”6 The
Committee also was charged with determining “the increased risk
of the disease among those exposed to herbicides during service in
the Republic of Vietnam and during the Vietnam era.”7 Further, the
Committee was asked to assess “whether there exists a plausible
biologic mechanism or other evidence of a causal relationship
between herbicide exposure and the disease” in question.8 Finally,
Congress charged the Committee with making recommendations
6

Agent Orange Act § 3(d)(1)(A); see also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 221.
Agent Orange Act § 3(d)(1)(B); see also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 221
(stating “the increased risk of each disease in question among those exposed to
herbicides during Vietnam service”).
8
Agent Orange Act § 3(d)(1)(C); see also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 221.
Some authors have argued that the first charge does not mandate the
Committee’s examination of “cause” or “causal association,” but instead
requires only that the Committee look into a possible “statistical association.”
However, the third question indeed requests that the Committee evaluate the
existence of “evidence of a causal relationship.” Notably, any determination
about the existence of “statistical association” that takes into account “strength”
of the evidence and “appropriateness” of the methods examines the same
concerns that enter into a consideration of evidence for causation. These
concerns (for example, the strength of the association and the methods used)
give rise to issues such as bias and confounding, which are defined in detail in
Parts II through IV. Thus, although the Committee was not charged with
drawing a conclusion about causation, the combination of responses to questions
one and three effectively results in a lengthy consideration of virtually all of the
issues that would be discussed if such a conclusion were required. As stated in a
recent update issued by the 2002 Committee:
The evaluation of evidence to reach conclusions about statistical
associations goes beyond quantitative procedures at several stages:
assessing the relevance and validity of individual reports; deciding on
the possible influence of error, bias, confounding, or chance on the
reported results; integrating the overall evidence within and between
diverse fields of research; and formulating the conclusions themselves.
Those aspects of the committee’s review required thoughtful
consideration of alternative approaches at several points and could not
be accomplished by adherence to a narrowly prescribed formula.
COMM. TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE
TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE 2002 28 (2003) [hereinafter VAO
UPDATE 2002].
7
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Agent Orange Act § 3(e) (directing the National Academy of Sciences to
“make any recommendations it has for additional scientific studies to resolve
areas of continuing scientific uncertainty relating to herbicide exposure”); see
also VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 15. One of these recommendations was to
commission an historical exposure reconstruction. Id. at 17-18. This
recommendation led to the studies of Agent Orange exposure in Vietnam
described by Dr. Jean Mager Stellman in this issue. See Jeanne Mager Stellman
& Steven D. Stellman, Characterization of Exposure to Agent Orange in
Vietnam Veterans As a Basis for Epidemiological Studies, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 505
(2005).
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for areas in which further study might help answer the questions of
concern.9
Faced with the above mandates, the Committee first clarified
the exposures to be evaluated. The Committee focused specifically
on exposure to Agent Orange. Agent Orange and the other
defoliants used in Vietnam were comprised of combinations of one
or more of four herbicides: 2,4-D (dichlorophenoxyacetic acid),
2,4,5-T
(trichlorophenoxyacetic
acid),
4-amino-3,5,6trichloropiclorinic acid (picloram), and dimethylarsenic acid
(DMA or cacodylic acid). Mixtures containing 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T
were contaminated by chemicals formed during the production
process, including 2,3,7,8-trichlorodibenzodioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD).
Although other dioxins and dibenzofurans were also formed,
2,3,7,8-TCDD is considered the most toxic and, as such, was the
compound reviewed most extensively by the Committee.
In the course of examining the effects of Agent Orange
exposure, the Committee never evaluated the claim of any
individual veteran, as this was not its charge. Indeed, the Agent
Orange Act specified that such decisions would be made by the
VA. Moreover, the Committee was instructed not to consider the
issue of potential compensation in its deliberations.
Before beginning its work, the members of the Committee
were required to disclose potential conflicts of interest or biases, or
anything that might create the appearance of a conflict of interest.
These included financial holdings, consulting activities,
government service, areas of research, and professional affiliations
as well as any public statements or intellectual positions relevant to
the topic of the Committee. Committee members served without
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compensation, except for reimbursement of expenses.
Because the scope of the review is broad, the Committee
includes health scientists representing expertise in a wide range of
fields covering epidemiology, oncology, neurology, reproductive
health, and toxicology. The IOM staff assists with the review,
conducting library searches that begin with hundreds, if not a few
thousand, of articles, and works with the Committee to
progressively narrow them down to those articles that are pertinent
to the questions at hand.
B. Types of Evidence Reviewed

10
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2,3,7,8-TCDD is produced as a by-product of the bleaching process
Such an event occurred in Seveso, Italy, when an explosion at a chemical
plant caused 2,3,7,8-TCDD to contaminate a wide residential area. See Pier
Alberto Bertazzi et al., Health Effects of Dioxin Exposure: A 20-year Mortality
Study, 153 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1031 (2001).
11
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For the scientists on the Committee, it was obvious that any
findings of health effects from these same exposures could serve as
evidence for potential effects in the Vietnam veterans, even if the
results were obtained in other populations. Scientists consider
biological systems in human beings to be sufficiently similar
throughout the world that a high proportion of research findings,
especially those that have been replicated in several studies, can be
“generalized” to much larger populations beyond those that were
studied. Because few studies actually were conducted on Vietnam
veterans, other data sources were frequently used as the basis for
the Committee’s decisions regarding the first and third questions
posed to it by the Act.
The three main sources of epidemiologic data used to address
the first question were studies conducted in: (a) occupational
groups with exposures in the workplace, such as chemical
manufacturing, farming, application of herbicides, or paper and
pulp manufacturing (where 2,3,7,8-TCDD is produced as a byproduct of the bleaching process);10 (b) populations with
environmental exposures, which typically result from accidents
that contaminate residential or recreational areas,11 or alternatively,
from residence in agricultural regions in which herbicides are
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See, e.g., Marilyn A. Fingerhut et al., Cancer Mortality in Workers
Exposed to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 212,
212 (1991); Kyle Steenland et al., Cancer, Heart Disease, and Diabetes in
Workers Exposed to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin. 91 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 779 (1999).
13
Manolis Kogevinas et al., Cancer Mortality in Workers Exposed to
Phenoxy Herbicides, Chlorophenols, and Dioxins: An Expanded and Updated
International Cohort Study, 145 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1061, 1061(1997).
14
See Bertazzi, supra note 11.
15
SCI. APPLICATIONS INT’L CORP., AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY, AN
EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION OF HEALTH EFFECTS IN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL
FOLLOWING EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES (1997), FOLLOW-UP EXAMINATION
RESULTS (2000).
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widely used; and (c) veterans who served in Vietnam, including
not only the U.S. armed forces, but also those from Australia.
Although hundreds of studies have been reviewed each time
the Committee has been convened (every two years), there are
some cohorts of exposed persons that have played a prominent role
in the deliberations. These cohorts had high exposures and were
evaluated numerous times, often for different health outcomes
(such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, neurologic disorders,
immune function and allergies, reproductive events, etc.), each
time contributing more information to our knowledge base. Some
of the most important of these were the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) cohort of workers
employed after 1942 at twelve plants that manufactured chemicals
containing 2,3,7,8-TCDD;12 a similar multinational cohort from
more than half a dozen European countries, assembled by the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC);13 the cohort
exposed to the explosion of a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy, in
1976 that released 2,3,7,8-TCDD over an area populated by more
than 200,000 persons;14 and the Air Force Health Study (AFHS),
also known as the “Ranch Hand” study, of U.S. Air Force
personnel responsible for flying spraying missions to defoliate
North Vietnam using Agent Orange (these missions were termed
“Operation Ranch Hand”).15
Each of these cohorts was characterized by higher than usual
exposures. For instance, in the two occupational cohorts, a subset
of the workers had experienced chloracne, an acute reaction of skin
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eruptions that follows high exposures to 2,3,7,8-TCDD. In addition
to the examination of multiple health endpoints, numerous subsets
of the cohorts also were examined more extensively. Furthermore,
in each of these four cohorts exposure was, at some point,
measured in blood drawn from a subset of participants.
The Ranch Hand study was the most extensive study of
veterans. The Air Force initiated this cohort study, which
attempted to recruit about 1,200 servicemen who were identified as
Ranch Hand personnel and 1,700 Air Force personnel who were
assigned to duty in Southeast Asia, but were not exposed
occupationally to herbicides. In 1982, a baseline examination was
conducted of both groups of men, and follow-up took place every
five years thereafter.
The Committee also held public hearings and invited written
submissions. These provided the Committee members with an
opportunity to hear from those most familiar with the conditions
and sequelae of service in Vietnam, as well as the authors of
relevant papers, including some that were in press, but not yet
published.
C. The Process

16

18

See VAO 1994, supra note 5, at 246.
Id.
Id. at 247.
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To provide a framework for its decisions, the initial committee,
which began meeting in 1992, defined four categories of
evidence.16 The first category consists of those health outcomes for
which the available data provide sufficient evidence of an
association.17 This category applies when multiple studies are
consistent in showing an association, and bias, confounding, or
random variation are not likely to explain the findings. The second
category consists of those health outcomes for which the available
research provides limited or suggestive evidence of an
association.18 This category may apply when multiple studies
observe an association, but the magnitude is sufficiently small that
bias, confounding, or random variation cannot be ruled out.
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Alternatively, there may be one or more reasonably high quality
studies showing an association that other studies do not confirm.
The third category is used to identify those health outcomes for
which the literature provides inadequate or insufficient evidence
from which to determine whether an association exists.19 This
category is used when there are very few studies, none of which is
definitive, or where there are many studies, but the quality is
inadequate (the studies might have failed to control confounding)
or the findings are inconsistent. Finally, the last category is used to
designate those health outcomes for which the extant research
provides limited or suggestive evidence of no association.20 This
category is used when there are numerous studies of reasonably
high quality, and they consistently show no association between
the exposure and the outcome.
The above categories were applied to the first question with
which Congress charged the Committee. With regard to the second
question, the paucity of data on those who served in Vietnam
precluded, for the most part, making a determination about the
magnitude of increased risk. First, the inability to assign exposures
to individual veterans, including the vast majority of those who
participated in the research studies that were conducted, was seen
as an enormous obstacle. When an agent induces a response, it is
recognized that the magnitude of the response, or the likelihood of
developing a disease, tends to increase as the exposure gets larger.
This phenomenon is referred to as “dose-response.” The
Committee concluded that, without knowledge of the exposure
level, the size of the risk could not be quantified. Even if an
average exposure level were known, it would still be difficult to
estimate an average risk because the existing research, whether in
veterans, exposed workers, or accidentally-exposed populations,
usually could not establish, that is, did not quantify, the doseresponse relationship. Given the lack of information about how
steeply the risk for each of the health outcomes evaluated would be
expected to rise, the Committee concluded that it was unable to
answer the second question regarding the “increased risk of each
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The term “risk” will be further defined later in this article but, for now, it
shall suffice to say that, in the judgment of the Committee, the number of cases
of each disease among Vietnam veterans due to herbicide exposure could not be
estimated with any reasonable accuracy.
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disease among those exposed” with any specificity.21
The responses to the third question—whether a biologically
plausible mechanism or other evidence supporting a causal
association existed—expanded the work of the Committee beyond
epidemiology and engaged the Committee in the review of a broad
spectrum of studies. The premise of this question is that any
determination about a causal relationship is strengthened when the
mechanism of action is understood. For example, researchers
might find that blood pressure in persons who have taken a certain
drug is generally lower than in those who have not. If in addition
researchers determine that this drug relaxes the smooth muscles in
the arterial walls known to be inversely related to blood pressure
(muscle contraction increases pressure, but relaxation reduces it),
then the plausibility of the drug having a causal effect (in this case
a protective one) is enhanced. The data used in evaluating biologic
plausibility may derive from a wide range of scientific fields,
including toxicokinetics, which examines how and at what rate
compounds are absorbed into the body, distributed to different
organs, chemically metabolized, and excreted; whole animal
toxicology, which addresses the pathologic and homeostatic
responses of the organism, often in rodents but also in other
species, including humans; and molecular and cellular biology,
which seeks to understand the biochemical alterations that result
from an exposure and the subsequent consequences for cell
functioning. Thus, biologic evidence from experimental studies in
humans, other animals, and test systems such as cell cultures is
used to determine whether a plausible mechanism exists. Such
evidence is considered to provide support for inferring causation
when statistical associations have been observed in human studies.
In evaluating the evidence pertaining to its congressional
mandate, the Committee made decisions regarding the relationship
between Agent Orange exposure and dozens of health outcomes.
Four of these will be reviewed in detail: (a) non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma, (b) Type II diabetes, (c) prostate cancer, and (d) the
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presumptive period for respiratory cancer. The first three are health
outcomes, while the final one is an issue of timing and causation.
The Committee concluded that the evidence for an association with
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was sufficient and that biologic
plausibility was established. For Type II diabetes and for prostate
cancer, the Committee concluded that there was limited but
suggestive evidence for an association. The VA had ruled that
respiratory cancer could be considered service-related only if it
manifested within a period of thirty years after the end of service in
Vietnam, termed the “presumptive period.” Charged with
determining whether this presumptive period had a scientific basis,
the Committee concluded that it did not. To provide the reader
with a background for understanding how the Committee reached
each of these conclusions, this article now turns to an exposition of
key concepts in scientific and epidemiologic research.
II. CAUSAL EFFECTS
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The concept of causation is fundamental to scientific inquiry,
which seeks to understand cause and effect relationships of
physical, chemical, or biological phenomena. Within biomedical
sciences, potential causes of disease and developmental disorders
are studied using a variety of tools, including epidemiology and
toxicology. In these fields, however, the concept of “cause” differs
from that which courts use in settling individual or even class
action cases.
To study the causal effects of an exposure, two identical
“units” must be compared, one exposed and one unexposed. A unit
might be, among other things, a person, a laboratory animal, a cell,
or a piece of tissue. In order for the study to produce results about
causal effects, it is essential that the two studied units be absolutely
identical, which is to say that they differ only with regard to the
exposure. Each unit is evaluated for some response, such as
growth, chemical or electrical activity, or structural or functional
change. The difference in response between the exposed unit and
the unexposed unit represents the “causal effect.”

06/23/2005 10:19:08
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Studies can be classified in many ways, but one significant
distinction is between experimental and observational studies.
Table 1 compares these two types of studies:
Table 1
Experiment

Observational Study

Identical units, such as a single
strain of laboratory mice

Units not identical

Scientist manipulates exposure
and determines which units are
or are not exposed

Exposure occurs beyond the
control of the scientist

Scientist determines (measures)
exposure levels

Scientist measures exposure
(measurements may be subject
to greater error than in
experiment)

Outcome is measured:
reliability will vary with the
nature of the outcome and the
quality of the protocol for its
measurement

Outcome is measured:
reliability will vary with the
nature of the outcome and the
quality of the protocol for its
measurement

06/23/2005 10:19:08

C M
Y K

20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 36 Side B

Notably, it is easier to ensure the use of identical “units” in an
experimental study than in an observational study. However, the
more fundamental difference is that, in an experimental study, the
exposure is controlled by the investigator; that is, the investigator
decides which unit will receive the exposure and which will not.
Typically, this decision is made randomly and either of the units
could be the chance recipient of the exposure. The investigator also
determines the level of exposure each unit receives and may assign
the units to different amounts or intensities of exposure. In an
observational study, by contrast, exposure is not assigned, but
rather, occurs for reasons that have nothing to do with any
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It should be noted that even in double-blind, placebo-controlled trials,
inferring general causation can be problematic, due largely to the fact that
persons who participate in these studies and who are compliant with the
treatment regimes are often a select group. Additionally, despite randomization,
the exposed and unexposed may differ in unmeasured ways, by chance,
particularly in small trials. Randomization reduces the likelihood of confounding
but does not eliminate it. See infra Part III.
23
See Donald B. Rubin & Roderick J. Little, Causal Effects in Clinical and
Epidemiological Studies Via Potential Outcomes: Concepts and Analytical
Approaches, 21 ANN. REV. PUBLIC HEALTH 121 (2000).
24
A response might be a continuous measurement such as blood pressure,
or a binary outcome, such as the presence or absence of disease.
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researcher’s actions. Historical, social, political, and physical
forces, as well as individual choices that may also be shaped by
any of the above factors, will determine when and where exposure
occurs. As a result, the exposed unit is rarely identical to the
unexposed unit. For this reason, the concept of causation in
observational studies has been more elusive than in experimental
studies.22
Recently however, a conceptual paradigm has been developed
that aids in the understanding of the conditions under which causal
inferences can be made from observational investigations.23 The
underlying concept is the “counterfactual” that contrasts two
scenarios. Under the first scenario, the individual unit (usually a
person, but also possibly a non-laboratory animal) is exposed and
its response is measured.24 Under scenario two, we suppose that
the individual is not exposed and, therefore, we can measure the
response that would have occurred had the individual, counter to
fact, not been exposed. We call this the counterfactual response.
Thus, the individual causal effect in an observational setting is the
difference between the actual and the counterfactual response.
Unfortunately, the individual causal effect can never be known
since researchers can never observe both the factual and
counterfactual experience. Epidemiologists, however, strive to
measure the group-level causal effect, which represents a type of
average of the individual-level effects, under the assumption that
the two groups (exposed and unexposed) each represent the
counterfactual experience, on average, of the other. In order to do
so, epidemiologists must first define the following terms: risk (R),
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risk factor (RF), risk difference (RD), and risk ratio (RR). Risk is
defined as the probability of disease, while risk factor refers to an
exposure or characteristic that increases risk or serves as a
surrogate for a factor that increases risk. Risk difference is
calculated by subtracting the “risk if exposed” value from the “risk
if unexposed” value. Finally, the risk ratio, also known as relative
risk, is defined as “risk if exposed” divided by “risk if unexposed.”
The importance of the counterfactual assumption cannot be
overemphasized. In any study, it is possible to make
measurements. In many studies, the risk difference or risk ratio can
be measured. However, defining these terms or measuring them
does not in itself make them meaningful in terms of causation.
Epidemiologists and other scientists often say that, “association
does not necessarily imply causation.” One can gain additional
insight into the source of various conditions and diseases through
the use of the sufficient causes model. Figure 1 provides an
example of the application of this paradigm:

Figure 1

Q

P

R

P

U
S

A: Single cause is
sufficient (rare
situation)

B: Two causes are
required and sufficient

T

C: Multiple causes are
required (common
situation)
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MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 8-12 (Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland
eds., 1998).
26
Sarah J. Spence, The Genetics of Autism, 11 SEMINAR PEDIATRIC
NEUROLOGY 196, 198 (2004).
27
Irva Hertz-Picciotto et al., Synergism Between Occupational Arsenic
Exposure and Smoking in Lung Cancer Induction, 3 EPIDEMIOLOGY 23, 28
(1992).
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Each circle, or pie, represents a set of sufficient causes.25 In
circle A, a single cause will result in the disease. This cause might
be, for example, the measles virus. The virus alone causes the
clinical entity we call measles. In circle B, a second factor is
needed; this example might apply if not all individuals exposed to
the virus actually exhibited the clinical symptoms of the disease,
that is, if some individuals lacked susceptibility to the virus. Thus,
in circle B, P is the virus, but R is also necessary because neither P
alone nor R alone results in the disease. In circle C, five factors are
necessary to cause disease. This type of scenario corresponds to
most chronic, or non-infectious, diseases, for which multiple
factors are likely to play a role in any individual case. By way of
example, it has been suggested that there may be more than ten
genes for autism.26 However, each child with autism probably does
not require all such genes to develop this disorder, and there may
be several environmental factors also involved. Note also that for
any given disease there may be several different sets of sufficient
causes; some individuals will require one set and others will
require a different, though possibly overlapping, set. For example,
among workers who smoke and are exposed to arsenic at their
workplace, some might develop respiratory cancer from the
cigarette smoke alone, while others might develop cancer from the
arsenic alone, and still others might develop respiratory cancer
only because they received both exposures.27
The sufficient causes model is also instructive in terms of
inferring individual causes. Knowledge about the presence or
absence of other known risk factors changes the probability that a
suspect risk factor was causal for an individual case. If an
individual who has never smoked, whose parents never smoked,
and who is not married to a smoker develops lung cancer, the
probability that this cancer was caused by some other known lung
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carcinogen is increased. If, for instance, that individual is known to
have high exposure to radon, the likelihood that the radon caused
the cancer is higher than it would be for another individual with the
same high exposure to radon who smoked or was exposed
passively to tobacco smoke.
III. STUDIES IN GROUPS: ESTIMATION AND PRECISION
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Researchers prefer to enroll groups for their studies rather than
rely on individuals, primarily because individuals almost never
provide definitive evidence about causal effects. In recognition of
this limitation, measurements are made on an enrolled group with
the idea that the results can be extrapolated to the population from
which the group arose, and hence, to other individuals who were
not participants in the study. The group that is studied is termed a
“sample,” and any measure on the sample is considered an
“estimate” of the parameter (risk ratio, for instance) for the
complete population.
For example, researchers concerned that adolescents with
symptoms of depression may engage in binge drinking of alcohol
might sample a group of high school students. In the sample,
researchers may determine what proportion of tenth and eleventh
graders attending one high school selected at random from all high
schools in a metropolitan school district exhibit depressive
symptoms (perhaps by use of a questionnaire). This result provides
an estimate of the true proportion of high school students with
depressive symptoms in that school district and perhaps in that
metropolitan area, that state, the country, or all similar countries.
If researchers also found out how many of those high school
students engaged in binge drinking, they could estimate the risk
ratio for binge drinking by comparing those with depressive
symptoms to those without such symptoms. The resulting risk ratio
would be an estimate of the risk ratio in the population. If the risk
ratio were 1.5, it would mean that high school students in the study
who had depressive symptoms were one and one-half times more
likely to engage in binge drinking than those who did not. If the
risk ratio were 1.0, it would mean that each group of high school
students had the same risk of engaging in binge drinking.
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However, epidemiologists recognize that the sample studied
might be different from or unrepresentative of the complete
population and thus they also construct a range around this
estimate. This range is known as a confidence interval and
represents a range of values that, on average and under certain
conditions, is expected to include the true population value. The
width of this interval is roughly a function of the study size, a good
indication of a more technical quantity known as statistical power.
In a study in which less than half of the population is exposed and
disease is not common, this power is mostly determined by the
number of exposed persons with disease. As the number of
exposed persons who develop disease increases, the confidence in
the estimate increases and the interval becomes tighter around the
estimate. For example, a small study with an RR of 1.5 might have
a 95% confidence interval of 0.5 to 4.5, in which case we would
say that the precision is low. A much larger study that also had an
RR of 1.5 might have a 95% confidence interval of 1.3 to 1.7,
indicating very high precision.
The above exposition emphasizes the estimation of effects. The
precision of these estimates (reflected in confidence intervals) is
related to another concept used by scientists and invoked in recent
court decisions regarding admissibility of scientific evidence,
namely “statistical hypothesis testing.” A common practice in
many scientific fields is to construct a “null hypothesis,” which
states that there is no association between the exposure and the
outcome. Once the study has been conducted, the result is
compared with the null hypothesis. If the study result is extremely
different from what is predicted by the “null hypothesis,” then,
assuming the data are reliable, one may conclude that the null
hypothesis is not supported because if it were true, then large
deviations from the null would be improbable. To quantify the
improbability of the result, one calculates its probability of
occurring under the dual assumptions of no association and
complete absence of any other information. The resulting
probability is called a “p-value.” It is sometimes referred to as an
“error” rate.
The merits and misuses of p-values have been the subject of
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One website lists “326 Articles/Books Questioning the Indiscriminate
Use of Statistical Hypothesis Tests in Observational Studies.” See http://www.
cnr.colostate.edu/~anderson/thompson1.html.
29
Note that if the 95% confidence interval includes the null value (0 for a
risk difference, 1 for a risk ratio), then the p-value will be greater than 0.05.
30
See infra Part V.
31
See infra Part IV.
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considerable debate within the scientific community.28 One
criticism of the p-value relates to the convention of using a
cutpoint of 0.05 to determine whether a finding is “significant”
(the designation when the p-value is less than 0.05, that is, when
the probability of the result is less than one in twenty if the null
hypothesis were true), and declaring all results with p-values above
0.05 as “nonsignificant.”29 The result of a statistical hypothesis test
is a decision of whether to “reject” the null hypothesis. In practice,
it is difficult to argue that results with a p-value of 0.051 are
qualitatively different from those with a p-value of 0.049. Another
problem is that the p-value combines two different aspects of the
study result: the magnitude of the association and its precision. For
instance, one study may have a p-value of 0.04 when the RR is 8.0;
this will be a less precise estimate (the confidence interval will be
wider) than another study with a p-value of 0.04 and an RR of 2.5.
To address this concern, many epidemiologists have preferred to
express their results with “estimates” and “confidence limits,”
thereby keeping these two aspects of the study findings clear and
separate.
It has also been noted that although a p-value provides
information about the consistency between the “null hypothesis”
and the data collected, it provides no information at all about any
other hypothesis. If one wanted to hypothesize that a risk is
doubled for individuals who are exposed, one would not calculate
a p-value. Similarly, if previous studies have already suggested
that the null hypothesis may not be true, then it may be of greater
interest to evaluate whether the new data are consistent with the
previously published findings rather than whether they are
consistent with a null effect. In fact, p-values do not provide the
means for placing findings in context,30 or for considering the
possibility of biases.31 Instead, they are calculated by either
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See Janet M. Lang et al., That Confounded P-Value, 9 EPIDEMIOLOGY 7,
8 (1998); The Editors, The Value of P, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 286 (2001).
33
I will not presume to guess what probability would correspond to the
criterion of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
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assuming no other information or by explicitly ignoring it.
Overall, it is unwise to make decisions on the basis of a single
set of data, a practice that is encouraged by the use of p-values.
Science does not actually proceed in the manner implied by
statistical hypothesis testing and, rather than relying on decisions at
the end of each study, scientists gather and review the body of
evidence as a whole. It has been suggested that the practice of
hypothesis testing detracts from scientific thinking; indeed, one
journal in the field of epidemiology strongly discourages the use of
p-values to summarize results32 and frequently asks authors to
remove them as a condition of accepting a paper.
Further critiques point out that the common use of p<0.05 as a
criterion for deciding to reject the null hypothesis is based on the
implicit assumption that there is a high cost to mistakenly rejecting
the null hypothesis and thereby “finding an association.” In other
words, this convention presumes that such a conclusion should be
made only very cautiously (society cannot afford to make this
mistake more than 5% of the time). In some circumstances, this
implicit assumption may prove problematic. If the harm from an
exposure is severe, a regulatory body, for example, may wish to err
on the side of protecting public health. This, however, would
require the use of different criteria. In the courtroom, a “more
likely than not” standard is used in some circumstances as the bar
against which to evaluate evidence. In a single study (absent any
other research), a p<0.50 means the probability is less than 50%
that the data (or more extreme data) arose from a population in
which exposure and disease are not associated. Hence, a p<0.50
would be much closer to the criterion of “more likely than not” for
evaluating whether the data arose from a population in which
exposure does not cause disease.33
While epidemiologists strive to conduct studies that produce
precise estimates, there is always the possibility that the estimate
could be wrong, not because of chance “sampling error” that
occurs with small or even moderate-sized samples, but because of
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a more systematic problem known as bias. When bias is present,
not only is the estimated association incorrect, but the p-value does
not represent the purported “error rate.” As we shall see, bias is
usually a greater concern than errors due to random fluctuations
that produce these error rates in observational studies.
IV. STUDIES IN GROUPS: BIAS
Bias is present when, on average, the estimates tend to be
either too high or too low relative to the true population parameter.
Figure 2 displays how bias can distort a relative risk by creating
either artificial effects or masking true effects:

Figure 2: Upward and Downward Bias
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The base of the wedge at the start of each arrow is the true
value of the risk ratio, and the arrowhead is at the biased
(observed) value. In case 1, an increased risk due to a harmful
exposure will be presumed to be smaller than it truly is. In case 2,
an exposure with no effect will be presumed to reduce risk. In case
3, an exposure that is beneficial (reduces risk) will appear to be
more beneficial than it really is, whereas in case 4, a beneficial
exposure will appear as though it has a small harmful effect. In
case 5, an exposure that has no effect will be presumed to be
harmful and, in case 6, a slightly harmful exposure will be
presumed to be more harmful than it is.
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Cases 1-3 show “downward” bias, and
cases 4-6 show “upward” bias.
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The main types of epidemiologic bias are selection bias,
information bias, confounding bias, and statistical bias. Selection
bias occurs when the subjects in the study sample do not represent
the targeted population with regard to the exposure and the disease.
Consider Figure 3, the epidemiologic two-by-two table in which
each individual falls into one of four cells: exposed with disease,
exposed without disease, unexposed with disease, or unexposed
without disease. A completely representative sample will take
approximately the same proportion from the population out of each
of the four cells. (This means that if 90% of the population is in the
cell for unexposed without disease, then 90% of the sample also
would be from that cell.) It is also possible to intentionally sample
at a different rate from one column or one row and still obtain an
unbiased estimate, but only if the investigator ensures that both
cells in that row or column are sampled in the same proportion.
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Figure 3: The Two-by-Two Table

Exposed:

Unexposed:

Diseased:

Exposed with
disease

Unexposed with
disease

Total diseased

Not diseased:

Exposed without
disease

Unexposed without
disease

Total without
disease

Total exposed

Total unexposed

Grand Total
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This point was made in a commentary by Irva Hertz-Picciotto &
Penelope P. Howards, Invited Commentary: Hot Tubs and Miscarriage:
Methodological & Substantive Reasons Why the Case Is Weak, 158 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 938 (2003) (critiquing Li De-Kun et al., Hot Tub Use during
Pregnancy and the Risk of Miscarriage, 158 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 931 (2003)).
35
See case 6 in Figure 2.
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More concretely, suppose that a study is conducted to examine
the hypothesis that the use of hot tubs by pregnant women
increases the risk of spontaneous abortion. Suppose further that
women who use hot tubs are more likely to participate in the study
because they have more leisure time and that women who have
spontaneous abortions are also more likely to participate because
they are concerned about why they lost their pregnancies. In
essence, a larger percentage of the population in the upper left cell
of the epidemiologic two-by-two table participated in the study
than the population percentage in the other cells. In other words,
proportionately fewer women who did not use a hot tub or who did
not spontaneously abort would participate in the study.34 This
would lead to an upward bias in the estimated RR. Thus, if, for the
sake of argument, the true risk ratio for spontaneous abortion from
hot tub use were 1.2, in this study we might see an estimated risk
ratio of 1.5.35 If the true risk ratio were 1.0, we might, for example,
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See case 1 in Figure 2.
See case 2 in Figure 2.
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observe a risk ratio of 1.2 or greater.36
In other examples, the bias might occur in the opposite
direction. For instance, researchers who studied high fat diets and
diabetes might find that persons eating high fat diets and diabetics
would be less likely to participate. In this case, the upper left cell
in Figure 3 would be underrepresented as compared to the
population at large. Therefore, if the true RR were 1.8, then one
might observe an RR of, say, 1.2;37 alternately, if the true RR were
1.0, one might observe a lower RR of, for instance, 0.7.38 In the
former case, researchers might incorrectly conclude that there is
only a small detrimental effect of the high fat diet when it is quite
harmful, and, in the latter case, the study incorrectly suggests a
protective effect, that is, a lower risk of diabetes among those who
eat high fat diets. In short, selection bias can lead one to draw the
wrong conclusion.
Information bias, by comparison, occurs when information
about the disease diagnosis differs between those who are exposed
and those who are unexposed. For example, bias might result
where individuals of low socioeconomic status who do participate
are more likely to be exposed than those at higher socioeconomic
levels, but less likely to be diagnosed because they lack health
insurance and rarely see a physician. Thus, persons with the
disease may be misclassified as healthy because they are not yet
diagnosed. Information bias also might occur when data on
exposure differs with regard to those who have the disease and
those who do not. For example, in a study of the possible
connection between pesticide use around the home and incidence
of childhood leukemia, parents may be asked to recall what
pesticide products they used and when. The parents of affected
children might be more likely to recall every insecticide or
fungicide used in or around their house than the parents of healthy
children. This would result in a specific type of information bias
termed reporting bias or recall bias, which usually results in
upward bias.
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Another type of bias, confounding bias, occurs when an
alternative risk factor for the disease (one that is not the exposure
of interest for the study) happens to occur more or less frequently
in the exposed as compared with the unexposed. Consider, for
example, a study to examine the hypothesis that exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) during infancy adversely affects
the cognitive development of children. Suppose that a major source
of PCBs to infants is breast milk. Then suppose that mothers who
breastfeed their infants are more educated and are more likely to
read to their children or offer other intellectual stimulation. Notice
that an experiment to test the hypothesis that PCBs adversely affect
cognitive development would randomly assign some mothers to
breastfeed and others to give formula. However, in the real world,
women who choose to breastfeed are not the same as those who do
not elect to breastfeed and hence cannot serve as the
“counterfactual” experience for those who do not breastfeed. The
result is confounding bias: children with a higher exposure to
PCBs were given greater intellectual stimulation. In this example,
the RR would be biased downward, but it is possible that in other
examples the RR could be biased upward.
A fourth type of bias is statistical bias. Statistical bias occurs as
a result of errors in statistical analysis or limitations in data.
Sometimes the methods used for analysis do not match the
conditions in which the data were collected or the variables as
defined by the investigator; hence, bias results. In other instances,
the adjustment for confounders is done incorrectly, and bias is
introduced inadvertently. Thus, to avoid statistical bias,
epidemiologists, in addition to having an intimate understanding of
the subject they are studying, must be knowledgeable about both
statistical methods and proper confounder selection strategies.
It is important to keep in mind that all of these types of bias
could be in either the positive (upward) or negative (downward)
direction. However, one cannot dismiss the results of a study
simply because there is a possibility of bias or confounding.
Frequently, one can glean information that bears on the direction
of bias. For example, if the factors tending toward downward bias
are stronger than those that would magnify the association between
exposure and disease, one would expect the true relationship to be
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V. REACHING CONSENSUS
In practice, epidemiologic studies are never perfect, and even
the best studies only approximately meet the necessary conditions
for risk ratios or risk differences to be interpreted as causal effects.
For this reason, it is nearly always true that causation cannot be
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This acts to reduce information bias.
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stronger than the one observed in the study.
This discussion about bias and precision can now be used to
answer the problem of how to measure causal effects in groups.
The key is that when certain conditions or requirements are met,
the association between exposure and disease may be interpreted
as a causal one or at least one can conclude that such an inference
probably does not stray far from the truth. These conditions and
requirements may be satisfied when (a) study subjects have been
properly sampled and recruited;39 (b) exposures and disease have
been measured or diagnosed accurately;40 (c) confounder data are
complete and adequately measured; and (d) the appropriate
multivariable statistical techniques have been used to analyze the
data. Under these conditions, once all confounders have been
accounted for, the unexposed group provides a good representation
of the counterfactual experience of the exposed group and the
analysis properly compares the group responses.
In other words, as long as the quality of data is reliable and the
analysis is statistically correct and appropriately takes account of
confounders, then the two groups (exposed and unexposed) can be
validly compared. In this scenario, one can infer that the study RD
or RR will be a measure of the causal effect of exposure. Of
course, this measured causal effect may or may not be a precise
estimate, as that will depend on whether the study has an adequatesized sample. The quality of an individual study, therefore,
depends on there being (1) minimum bias, which is achieved
through careful design, sound methods of data collection and
measurement of exposures and disease, and appropriate statistical
treatment of the data; and (2) an adequate-sized study sample.

20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 43 Side B

06/23/2005 10:19:08

HERTZ MACROED 051905.DOC

578

5/23/2005 7:48 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

06/23/2005 10:19:08

C M
Y K

20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 43 Side B

inferred from a single study, but rather, must be examined in a
multitude of studies. The problem is less acute when experimental
(randomized) studies are possible, such as for the evaluation of
drugs that are believed to impart a benefit to those taking them. In
this situation, the evaluation of evidence is more straightforward
than it would be for exposures for which it would be unethical to
conduct such research (such as cigarette smoking or asbestos
exposure). It is these latter, allegedly harmful exposures that have
generated discussion about how to infer causation. This discussion
has focused on how epidemiologists should evaluate a body of
evidence from multiple studies, including human epidemiologic
investigations, experimental data from whole animals, and
mechanistic research in which cells or tissues are manipulated to
understand physiologic or biochemical processes believed to be
related to pathogenesis in the human body.
As the body of evidence grows and new hypotheses are
proposed, the research community begins the process of reaching
consensus regarding which studies and ideas it finds convincing.
Arriving at a consensus can take months, years, or decades. For
example, consensus regarding the role of the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in AIDS took a relatively short
time, whereas the environmental contribution to breast cancer still
remains contentious.
Consensus does not require and is not synonymous with
unanimity. Even today it is possible to find some who are
unconvinced about the relationship between HIV and AIDS or
between smoking and lung cancer. That being said, the reaching of
consensus often follows a typical pattern, in which evidence
accrues and scientific opinion shifts. For example, consider a study
that finds a previously unstudied association in which exposure E
is related to an increased risk of disease D. To receive attention,
the study often would have observed a strong association.
Frequently, these first findings are based on a small sample size.
Some scientists may reject these findings because they object to
the study’s methodology. Other researchers will then attempt to
replicate the finding using improved methodology and maybe
larger study samples, but it is possible that only some of the studies
will confirm the original result. Over time, the weight of the
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evidence will tend to fall on one side or the other. At some point, a
meta-analysis or “quantitative review,” which is a combined
analysis of multiple studies, will be conducted. For this, it is
preferable to use high quality studies as this type of analysis is
more effective in addressing the precision of results than the
biases. Meanwhile, toxicologic or other basic science studies may
or may not demonstrate a plausible mechanism. Thus, the
consensus will build either in support or in contradiction of a
causal effect.
Although ideally scientists will evaluate evidence in a valuefree context, it is increasingly recognized that it is impossible for
scientists to be totally “objective” because individuals are
unavoidably influenced by their particular cultures and personal
experiences. Studies have documented how these experiences
influence the way in which individuals assess scientific studies and
place greater weight on certain studies or lines of evidence as
compared with others. It should be noted that the IOM, in
assembling its committees, consciously seeks to achieve not only
diversity of fields of expertise, but also “balance” among possible
biases on its committees.
Although criteria have existed for inferences about microbial
causes of infections for more than a century, the discussion about
causal inference for chronic diseases is more recent. In the 1960s,
the debate as to whether cigarette smoking causes lung cancer
provided the impetus for the development of a specific set of
guidelines for inferring causality. These were summarized by Sir
Bradford Hill41 and include the following primary considerations:
1. Temporality: A cause must precede an effect.
2. Strength of Association: A high RR or RD provides
greater weight than a low one.
3. Coherence: Evidence from other fields should support,
not contradict, the causal hypothesis.
4. Biologic Plausibility: Known biologic facts should
support, not contradict, the proposed causal effect.
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5. Consistency: Multiple studies using different designs
and/or different populations should confirm the finding.
6. Dose-response: The greater the exposure, the greater
should be the likelihood of a response.
7. Specificity: The outcome should be less frequent in the
absence of exposure or after removal of the exposure.
These considerations are not formal criteria and Hill himself
cautioned against using them as such, although such misuse is
often found in the scientific literature.42 Moreover, it can be shown
that failure to observe several of these facets of an association does
not necessarily detract from the conclusion of causality. In fact, it
has been argued that only temporality is truly required.43
VI. THE IOM COMMITTEE AND ITS EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC
OUTCOMES FOR VIETNAM VETERANS
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See, e.g., Carl V. Phillips & Karen J. Goodman, The Missed Lessons of
Sir Austin Bradford Hill, 1 EPIDEMIOLOGIC PERSPECTIVES & INNOVATIONS 3
(2004), available at http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/pdf/1742-5573-13.pdf. These considerations have now spilled over into the courts as well. See
Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G. Lasker, The Case Against Differential
Diagnosis: Daubert, Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific Method,
37 J. HEALTH L. 85 (2004).
43
Mervyn Susser, Falsification, Verification, and Causal Inference in
Epidemiology: Reconsiderations in the Light of Sir Karl Popper’s Philosophy,
in CAUSAL INFERENCE (Kenneth J. Rothman ed., 1988).
44
See VAO 1994, supra note 5.
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Applying the epidemiological principles discussed earlier in
this article, this section reviews the evidence and reasoning behind
the decisions reached by the Committee with regard to nonHodgkin’s lymphoma, Type II diabetes, prostate cancer, and the
presumptive period for respiratory cancer.
In the case of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, the first Committee,
which completed its review in 1994, concluded that the evidence
was sufficient regarding an association with herbicides or their
contaminants.44 A sizable number of studies in occupational
cohorts had been conducted, and although many showed either no
association (RR=1.0) or very slight associations, quite a few
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studies showed an elevated risk of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
These included studies of Swedish workers who were exposed to
phenoxy herbicides;45 forest conservationists who worked for the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (RR=2.5, 95% CI=1.0 to 6.3);46
farmers in Kansas who had used herbicides for more than twenty
days per year (RR=6.0, 95% CI=1.9 to 19.5);47 Canadian farmers
who applied pesticides to more than 250 acres (RR=2.2, 95%
CI=1.0 to 4.6);48 Washington State forestry herbicide appliers
(RR=4.8, 95% CI=1.2 to 19.4);49 and Italian farmers licensed to
use pesticides (RR=1.8, 95% CI=1.2 to 2.5).50 In addition to these
studies of occupational exposures, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was
increased among male residents of Italian provinces in
contaminated areas (RR=2.2, 95% CI=1.4 to 3.5),51 and in a
Finnish community in which the water supply was contaminated
with chlorophenols (RR=2.8, with a 95% CI=1.4 to 5.6).52 Also,
unlike many of the other health outcomes examined, nonHodgkin’s lymphoma was observed at a higher rate in Vietnam
45
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See Bodil Persson et al., Malignant Lymphomas and Occupational
Exposures, 46 BR. J. IND. MED. 516 (1989); Lennart Hardell, Malignant
Lymphoma and Exposure to Chemical Substances, in Particular Organic
Solvents, Chlorphenol and Phenoxyacetates, 77 LAKARTIDNINGEN 208 (1980).
46
See Michael C. Alavanja et al., Mortality Among Forest and Soil
Conservationists, 44 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 94 (1989).
47
See Shelia Hoar et al., Agricultural Herbicide Use and Risk of
Lymphoma and Soft-Tissue Sarcoma, 256 JAMA 1141 (1986), erratum, 256
JAMA 3351 (1986).
48
See Donald T. Wigle et al., Mortality Study of Canadian Male Farm
Operators: Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma Mortality and Agricultural Practices in
Saskatchewan, 82 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 575, 579 Tbl.7 (1990).
49
See James S. Woods & L. Polissar, Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma among
Phenoxy Herbicide-Exposed Farmworkers in Western Washington State, 18
CHEMOSPHERE 401 (1987).
50
See G. Corrao et al., Cancer Risk in a Cohort of Licensed Pesticide
Users, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK, ENV’T & HEALTH 203 (1989).
51
Paolo Vineis et al., Incidence Rates of Lymphomas and Soft-Tissue
Sarcomas and Environmental Measurements of Phenoxy Herbicides, 83 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. 362 (1991).
52
P. Lampi et al., Cancer Incidence Following Chlorophenol Exposure in a
Community in Southern Finland, 47 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 167, 171 Tbl.5
(1992).
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veterans than in the general population. As of the review
conducted by the first IOM Committee, an excess of nonHodgkin’s lymphoma cases had been observed in several studies
of U.S. Navy personnel (RR =2.2, 95% CI=1.2 to 3.9),53 or Marine
personnel (RR=2.1, 95% CI=1.2 to 3.854 and RR=3.2 95% CI =1.4
to 7.455).
In total, more than two dozen studies showed some indication
of excess mortality or incidence from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
Not all of these studies were of the highest quality and there were
some studies that showed no excess risk, that is, no significant
departures from the expected level of risk. Although many of the
studies cited above adjusted for potential confounders, such
variables could have created the appearance of an association
(increased the estimated RR) or could have obscured an
association (reduced the estimated RR). In some of the studies, the
definition of exposure was extremely broad and probably included
a high proportion of individuals who were not exposed to any of
the herbicides that were used in Vietnam, resulting in “information
bias.” In such circumstances, it would be easy to underestimate the
effect of an exposure. In light of what might be an expected
“downward” bias, the replication across quite a number of
investigations that had an adequate sample size was impressive.
Neither the Seveso cohort56 nor the chemical production
workers57 experienced increased risks for non-Hodgkin’s
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The Selected Cancers Cooperative Study Group, The Association of
Selected Cancers with Service in the U.S. Military in Vietnam III, Centers for
Disease Control, Hodgkin’s Disease, Nasal Cancer, Nasopharyngeal Cancer,
and Primary Liver Cancer, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2495 (1990).
54
Patricia Breslin et al., Proportionate Mortality Study of U.S. Army and
U.S. Marine Corps Veterans of the Vietnam War, 30 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED.
412, 416 Tbl.6 (1988).
55
PATRICIA BRESLIN ET AL., VETERAN’S ADMINISTRATION, NONHODGKIN’S LYMPHOMA AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS (1987).
56
See Pier Alberto Bertazzi et al., Ten-Year Mortality Study of the
Population Involved in the Seveso Incident in 1976, 129 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
1187 (1989); Angela C. Pesatori et al., Cancer Morbidity in the Seveso Area,
1976-1986, 25 CHEMOSPHERE 209 (1992).
57
Fingerhut et al., supra note 12, at 216; Andreas Zober et al., Thirty-FourYear Mortality Follow-Up of BASF Employees Exposed to 2,3,7,8-TCDD after
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lymphoma. As these groups were most heavily exposed to 2,3,7,8TCDD, with little or no exposure to the herbicides in Agent
Orange, the epidemiologic data tended to suggest that the
associations were more likely due to 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. However,
the Committee did not attempt to make the case that these
compounds were the causal agents.
Biologic plausibility that Agent Orange was capable of
producing this type of cancer was supported by a study that
produced lymphoma in female mice after the administration of
2,3,7,8-TCDD.58 However, the Committee noted that the
herbicides contained in Agent Orange, including 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T,
picloram, and cacodylic acid, had been inadequately tested in
animals.
The conclusion of sufficient evidence drew on a set of studies
that showed fair consistency. While not all studies could
definitively exclude bias or confounding, it was unlikely that all of
the studies were biased in the same direction. Moreover, in several
investigations, the groups with the best-documented or highest
probability of exposure showed the greatest increase in risk. Later
studies confirmed the findings of excess risk for non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma in yet other populations.59
Type II diabetes and prostate cancer are both characterized as

06/23/2005 10:19:08

C M
Y K

20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 46 Side A

the 1953 Accident, 62 INST. ARCH. OCCUPATIONAL ENVT’L HEALTH 139 (1990);
Alfred Manz et al., Cancer Mortality among Workers in Chemical Plant
Contaminated with Dioxin, 338 LANCET 959 (1991).
58
See James Huff et al., Long-Term Carcinogenesis Studies on 2,3,7,8tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin and Hexachlorodibenzo-p-dioxins, 7 CELL
BIOLOGY AND TOXICOLOGY 67 (1991).
59
See, e.g., COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM
VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE 1996 (1996)
[hereinafter VAO UPDATE 1996]; COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS
IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE 1998
(1999) [hereinafter VAO UPDATE 1998]; COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH
EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE:
UPDATE 2000 (2001) [hereinafter VAO UPDATE 2000]; VAO UPDATE 2002,
supra note 8.
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having “limited/suggestive” evidence of an association. For Type
II diabetes, data were considered inadequate at the time the first
three Committees evaluated the evidence. (The first two
Committees considered the broader grouping of metabolic
disorders as a whole, largely because little research had been
published relating diabetes to the herbicides used in Vietnam or
their contaminants.) Nevertheless, the third Committee, which
published its findings in Update 1998, noted that a number of
reports, including one on the Ranch Hand personnel, showed
altered glucose metabolism. The Update reported, “Further
analyses and full publication of existing studies may justify a
reevaluation of this conclusion.”60 A flurry of papers appeared
between 1996 and 2000 suggesting some association with 2,3,7,8TCDD (“dioxin”).61 As a result, the fourth Committee, which
published its result in 2000, determined that the evidence was
limited, but suggestive of an association with exposures incurred in
Vietnam. Among residents exposed to dioxin because of the
industrial accident in Seveso, deaths from diabetes occurred at a
higher rate than in the reference population that was not exposed,
particularly among females.62 Excess mortality from diabetes was
60
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VAO UPDATE 1998, supra note 59, at 11.
61
See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Calvert et al., Evaluation of Diabetes Mellitus,
Serum Glucose, and Thyroid Function among United States Workers Exposed to
2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 56 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 270
(1999); Gary L. Henriksen et al., Serum Dioxin and Diabetes Mellitus in
Veterans of Operation Ranch Hand, 8 EPIDEMIOLOGY 252 (1997); Angela C.
Pesatori et al., Dioxin Exposure and Non-Malignant Health Effects: A Mortality
Study, 55 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 126 (1998); John Vena et al.,
Exposure to Dioxin and Nonneoplastic Mortality in the Expanded IARC
International Cohort Study of Phenoxy Herbicide and Chlorophenol Production
Workers and Sprayers, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 645 (Supp. 2 1998),
available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/1998/Suppl-2/645-653vena/vena.
html; COMMONWEALTH DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, MORBIDITY OF VIETNAM
VETERANS: A STUDY OF THE HEALTH OF AUSTRALIA’S VIETNAM VETERAN
COMMUNITY, VOLUME 1: MALE VIETNAM VETERANS SURVEY AND COMMUNITY
COMPARISON OUTCOMES (1998) [hereinafter COMMONWEALTH STUDY]; Morris
F. Cranmer et al., Exposure to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) is
Associated with Hyperinsulinemia and Insulin Resistance, 56 TOXICOLOGICAL
SCIENCES 431, 433 (2000).
62
See Pier A. Bertazzi et al., The Seveso Studies on Early and Long-Term
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observed in a multinational European cohort of chemical
production workers,63 although the excess was not statistically
significant. No excess was observed by Steenland et al., who
studied the U.S. cohort of chemical workers assembled by
NIOSH.64
Typically, Type II diabetes is not fatal and is often not listed on
a death certificate, even if one of its complications is the cause of
death. For this reason, studies of mortality from diabetes would be
limited in their ability to detect associations with exposures. By
comparison, diagnoses among the living might provide a more
complete ascertainment of cases, and hence, studies on morbidity
would be considered more definitive. In one such study, selfreports of diabetes were substantially higher than expected in
Australian veterans who served in Vietnam.65 Among Air Force
personnel who participated in the “Ranch Hand” study, glucose
abnormalities and use of oral medications for diabetes were
elevated.66 Additionally, higher blood serum concentrations of
2,3,7,8-TCDD were associated with an elevated incidence of Type
II diabetes.67 Table 2 shows the risk ratios for men whose blood
serum TCDD was in the three upper quartiles as compared with
those whose blood serum TCDD was in the lowest quartile. The
data do not show a perfect trend of increasing risk, but the upper
two quartiles seem to be at higher risk than the lower two.

06/23/2005 10:19:08

C M
Y K

20313_blp_13-2 Sheet No. 47 Side A

Effects of Dioxin Exposure: A Review, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 625
(Supp. 2 1998), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/1998/Suppl-2/
625-633bertazzi/bertazzi.html.
63
See Vena et al., supra note 60.
64
See Kyle Steenland et al., Cancer, Heart Disease, and Diabetes in
Workers Exposed to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 91 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 779, 785 (1999).
65
See COMMONWEALTH STUDY, supra note 60.
66
See Henriksen et al., supra note 60.
67
See Matthew P. Longnecker et al., Serum Dioxin Level in Relation to
Diabetes Mellitus among Air Force Veterans with Background Levels of
Exposure, 11 EPIDEMIOLOGY 44 (2000).
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Table 2: Incidence of Type II diabetes among Air Force
Ranch Hand personnel according to blood serum
concentration of dioxin, in quartiles.

1st quartile
(lowest )

2nd quartile

3rd quartile

4th quartile
(highest)

Risk ratio*

1

0.9

1.9

1.7

95% confidence
interval

--

Serum dioxin
concentration:

(0.5, 1.6)

(1.1, 3.2)

(1.0, 2.9)

*adjusted for family history, age, race, and military occupation
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The confidence intervals (CIs) indicate that the data are
consistent with anywhere between a rather small increased risk
(RR just slightly above 1.0) and a fairly substantial one (a nearly
three-fold higher risk). This study is notable in that the designation
of diabetes was based on a clinical examination, not self-reporting.
Additionally, a study conducted among residents near a hazardous
waste site with dioxin contamination showed elevated risks for
“high” fasting insulin if their serum TCDD concentration was
elevated.68 In general, the conclusion that the data showed
limited/suggestive evidence of association was based on both the
mortality and morbidity studies, with emphasis on the latter. The
fact that some of these associations occurred in Vietnam veterans
also weighed into the Committee’s deliberations. Nevertheless,
because many of the studies relied on self-reported illness,
therefore raising the possibility of bias, the evidence fell far short
of being sufficient.
A large number of studies have addressed the risk for prostate

See Cranmer et al., supra note 60, at 431-33.
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See, e.g., VAO UPDATE 2002, supra note 8.
See Howard Morrison et al., Farming and Prostate Cancer Mortality,
137 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 270 (1993).
71
Bertazzi et al., supra note 56.
72
See VAO UPDATE 2000, supra note 59; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HERBICIDE/DIOXIN EXPOSURE AND TYPE 2
DIABETES (2000).
70
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cancer.69 Evaluation of this health outcome is difficult for several
reasons. First, it is very common among elderly men, and second,
most of the risk ratios are small (approximately 1.2). This is likely
to occur when an outcome has multiple causes because no single
cause is responsible for a high proportion of cases. Another factor
to consider is the question of incidence versus mortality. Mortality
is influenced by the aggressiveness of a tumor, but also by several
other factors, including the quality of care, the treatment, and the
stage at which the disease was diagnosed. In turn, these factors are
affected by such variables as access to care and a patient’s
socioeconomic status. Thus, even if an exposure increases the
incidence of prostate cancer, it may not show an association with
mortality from prostate cancer because so much can intervene to
alter survival after the occurrence of disease. Some of the early
evidence used in the Committee’s decision came from a wellconducted investigation of farmers or herbicide applicators, where
greater exposures conferred higher risk,70 and a number of
occupational cohort studies in which risk was increased, but not
significantly so. Additionally, the exposed population in Seveso
showed an increased risk of prostate cancer.71 In subsequent
reviews of the evidence, the trend continued as many studies
produced slightly elevated risk ratios while a few studies suggested
a stronger association.
The Committee has, during updates of the reports, changed the
classification of some of the health outcomes. For example, as
mentioned above, diabetes was first classified as having inadequate
evidence and then categorized as having limited or suggestive
evidence of an association at the 2000 Update and by a separate
committee convened to address this question on its own.72
Although it has not happened yet, it is possible that the Committee
could find the evidence regarding some outcome to be inadequate
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See Disease Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents
(Multiple Myeloma and Respiratory Cancers), 59 Fed. Reg. 29723-01 (June 9,
1994) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
74
The half-life is the time it takes for the concentration to decrease to half
of what it was.
75
See Dieter Flesch-Janys et al., Elimination of Polychlorinated Dibenzo-pdioxins and Dibenzofurans in Occupationally Exposed Persons, 47 J.
TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 363, 377 (1996); Joel E. Michalek & Ram C.
Tripathi, Pharmacokinetics of TCDD in Veterans of Operation Ranch Hand: 15-
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after that disease was in the limited or suggestive category if newer
studies were conducted that tended to show no association and
were of higher quality than the earlier ones.
The fourth and final example of how the Committee has
reviewed evidence concerns respiratory cancer and the
“presumptive period.” The VA had ruled that respiratory cancer
could be considered service related only if it manifested within
thirty years following one’s service in Vietnam.73 This thirty-year
period was referred to as the “presumptive period.” The Committee
was asked to determine whether there was a scientific basis for this
presumptive period. However, based on all of the empirical
evidence from Vietnam veterans and other exposed populations,
the question simply could not be answered. The analysis of time
since the beginning of employment in exposed jobs suggested that
the elevated risk for respiratory cancer might continue for at least
the third decade. But this analysis begs the question, how long
after an exposure ends will risk continue to be increased? Most
occupational studies had not analyzed the mortality among cohorts
of workers to determine whether excess risk of respiratory cancer
changed with time since exposure ended. For the Seveso cohort, an
insufficient period of time has elapsed to evaluate the thirty-year
presumptive period (the accident occurred in 1976, fewer than
thirty years prior to this writing). Thus, given the lack of pertinent
epidemiologic data, the Committee relied on toxicokinetic data
about how the chemicals of interest are stored in the body and on
current understanding of the biology of human cancer. Dioxin is
known to have a relatively long half-life in human tissues.74 This
TCDD half-life is estimated at between seven and nine years, but
this period depends on the amount of fat in the studied individual75
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Year Follow-Up, 57 J. TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 369, 376 (1999).
76
The period between the start of a disease process and the time it is
diagnosed is termed the “latent period.”
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and may differ between men and women. Hence, after external
exposure ends, the compound remains in fatty tissue, circulates in
the blood, and deposits itself in various organs. At any time during
this period, disease induction can occur even though external
exposure has ceased. In addition, disease detection may occur long
after induction.76
Cancer progresses through multiple stages, beginning with
initiation, the time at which a cell’s DNA is damaged. The
damaged cell then escapes the surveillance of the body’s repair
system and the immune system, which usually hunts out damaged
cells. Other changes, known as promotion, may occur until the cell
begins to divide unchecked, resulting in proliferation. Further
stages enable the tumor to develop its own blood supply.
The point at which diagnosis occurs is determined by biologic,
social, and individual psychologic factors. Biologic determinants
will include the aggressiveness of the tumor, age of the person, and
presence of other medical conditions that might influence
immunologic competence. The social factors will include access to
care, the quality of any screening program, and the skill and
vigilance of the health provider. Individual characteristics that
influence how early in the disease process a diagnosis is made
include the propensity to seek medical care, which is highly
variable in the population and is related to the degree of trust
placed in the medical profession, and the fear of a diagnosis of
cancer.
Given the above considerations, the Committee concluded that
there was no scientific justification for a presumptive period of
thirty years for respiratory cancer. The possibility that circulating
TCDD might result in the initiation of cancer decades after a
veteran’s service in Vietnam had ended could not be excluded. A
further consideration was the uncertain length of the latency period
between the initiation of the disease process and the diagnosis.
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The IOM Committees were charged with determining whether
there were associations between health outcomes and herbicides
used in Vietnam or their contaminants. The IOM Committees
addressed three questions: whether there was a statistical
association between the exposures and any health outcomes, what
magnitude of increased risk Vietnam veterans would be expected
to experience for each of the health outcomes due to herbicide
exposures incurred while in Vietnam, and whether evidence
supported the biologic plausibility of a causal association. To
answer the first question, the Committees classified the outcomes
into four categories of evidence (sufficient, limited or suggestive,
inadequate, or limited evidence of no association) and adopted an
approach that weighed the body of evidence and took into
consideration the methodologic rigor of the studies. With regard to
the second question, that of quantifying the risk to Vietnam
veterans, the Committee concluded that the increased risk could
not be identified due to the lack of adequate data quantifying the
exposures of those who served in Vietnam. To address the third
question, that is, whether a plausible biologic mechanism exists
through which the herbicides and their contaminants could cause
specific health outcomes, the Committee evaluated a wide range of
data types, including toxicologic studies in humans and
experimental animals, and research on mechanisms that use tissues
and cell cultures.
In reviewing the Committees’ findings, it is important to
remember that most non-infectious diseases are caused by multiple
factors and that to determine the effects of exposure, causality is
defined in an individual, but can only be measured in groups.
Epidemiologists therefore study groups and, for ethical reasons,
frequently rely on observational rather than experimental methods.
The quality of observational studies depends on minimizing the
four types of bias and maximizing precision by using large sample
sizes (particularly with regard to the number of exposed cases of
disease). Statistical significance is a small part of evidence, and the
use of p-values for causal inference can result in faulty
conclusions. Single studies can add to or detract from evidence for
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causality, but ultimately an inference of causality depends on
replication across studies that provide precise estimates of effects
and that are relatively free of bias. Accrual of epidemiologic
evidence over time, along with experimental studies in animals and
cell or tissue cultures that establish mechanisms, generally leads
towards a consensus as to whether an exposure causes a health
outcome, although this process often takes years or longer. The
evidence about health effects of herbicides used in Vietnam and
their contaminants was slow to accumulate, partially because a
concerted effort to study the veterans longitudinally, beginning
from the time of their return to the United States, was not
undertaken, and partially because it was technologically difficult to
study dioxin, as it is present in such small quantities.
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